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Housing - Mobile Homes - Some Legal Questions
Because of the increasing use of the mobile home as a form of
housing, practitioners will be handling an ever-increasing number of
cases dealing with the problems of the mobile home resident. The
four major areas of investigation of mobile home law dealt with here
are taxation, zoning, warranties, and fixtures. The purpose of the
article is not to reveal any particular deficiencies in West Virginia's
mobile home law, but rather to investigate and synthesize the law
in a comprehensive review. While there are certain areas where the
need for reform has been suggested, compiling the law as a research
guide for the practitioner has been the main goal.
I. TAXATION
In 1932 when the Tax Limitation Amendment' was ratified,
mobile homes2 were not a widely used form of housing.3 It is not
surprising, therefore, that a problem of property tax classification
of mobile homes within the legislation authorized by TLA has arisen.
TLA requires the formation of four classes of taxable property, with
a maximum aggregate tax rate permissible for each class.4 The four
classes may be characterized as:
I W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1 [hereinafter referred to as TLA].
2 It should be noted at the outset that this article deals only with mobile
homes as opposed to trailers or campers. One commentator has defined a mobile
home as:
The modem house trailer, more appropriately known as a mobile
home, is a large, compact, completely equipped apartment on wheels.
It includes sleeping, cooking, washing and sanitation facilities. It is a
unit independent of outside facilities except for water, gas and electric
supply and sewage disposal. The mobile home is 10 or 12 feet wide,
usually 50 or 55 feet in length, and can be moved only by special
equipment.
Eshelman, Municipal Regulation of House Trailers in Pennsylvania, 66 Dxcm. L.
REv. 301 (1962).
3 There were only 55,000 mobile homes manufactured in the United States
in 1936. The number in use had increased to 1,200,000 by 1959. Note, Toward
an Equitable and Workable Program of Mobile Home Taxation, 71 YALn L.J.
702, 703 & n.8 (1962).
4 W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
[E]xcept that the aggregate of taxes assessed in any one year upon
personal property employed exclusively in agriculture, including horti-
culture and grazing, products of agriculture as above defined, including
livestock, while owned by the producer, and money, notes, bonds, bills
and accounts receivable, stocks and other similar intangible personal
property shall not exceed fifty cents on each one hundred dollars of
value thereon and upon all property owned, used and occupied by the
owner thereof exclusively for residential purposes and upon farms
occupied and cultivated by their owners or bona-fide tenants one
382
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I -Agricultural personal property, products of agricul-
ture and other intangible personal property;
H -Residential property and real property used in farm-
ing;
III - Other real and personal property situated outside
municipalities; and
IV- Other real and personal property situated inside
municipalities.5
The present difficulty in the classification of mobile homes'
apparently results from a misreading of the specific language defining
the classes of property. Class II property is, "[a]ll property owned,
used and occupied by the owner exclusively for residential pur-
poses .. ."I A survey of the county assessors in West Virginia
showed that, of the forty-three counties responding, thirty-five of
them classify only those mobile homes occupied by the owner and
situated on his own land in Class 11.8 Mobile homes occupied by the
owner and situated on leased land are generally treated as Class ImI
or IV property. The consequences of this practice and its possible
solution will be the subject of this article.
A. The Present Practice: A Statutory Misinterpretation
A mobile home, occupied by its owner but situated on leased
land falls within one of the statutory definitions of personal property,
dollar; and upon all other property situated outside of municipalities,
one dollar and fifty cents; and upon all other such property situated
within municipalities, two dollars ....
sW. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 8, § 5 (Michie 1966):
For the purpose of levies, property shall be classified as follows:
Class I. All tangible personal property employed exclusively in
agriculture, including horticulture and grazing;
All products of agriculture (including livestock) while owned by
the producer;
All notes, bonds, bills and accounts receivable, stocks and any
other intangible personal property;
Class II. All property owned, used and occupied by the owner
exclusively for residential purposes;
All farms, including land used for horticulture and grazing, occu-
pied and cultivated by their owners or bona fide tenants;
Class II. All real and personal property situated outside of mu-
nicipalities, exclusive of Classes I and 11;
Class IV. All real and personal property situated inside of mu-
nicipalities, exclusive of Classes I and II.
6 A survey of the county assessors in West Virginia revealed that at least
three different methods of classification are presently being used. The results
of the survey are in Appendix L
7W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 8, § 5 (Michie 1966).
8 Survey, Appendix I. See note 6, supra.
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which is, "all fixtures attached to land, if not included in the valua-
tion of such land entered in the proper land book .... ." The State
Tax Commissioner has instructed the county assessors to treat build-
ings placed on land by a lessee that are, "not of a permanent char-
acter or not attached to the real estate as a permanent improvement"'0
as the personal property of the lessee. Characterizing mobile homes
on leased property as personal property is not, however, the reason
for the current classification problem. It arises from an apparent
misreading of the Class II definition as excluding personal property.
The statute, however, explicitly states that Class H includes, "[a]ll
property. . . ."" A mobile home that is personal property would,
therefore, fall within the category of "[a]ll property." It also can be,
"owned, used and occupied by the owner exclusively for residential
purposes"' 2 even though it is situated on leased land. A mobile home
on leased property thus meets all the definitional requirements of
Class H property. A further indication that Class 11 can include
personal as well as real property is found in the language defining
Classes I and IV as, "[a]ll" real and personal property... exclu-
sive of Classes I and H.' '3 This shows that the legislature contem-
plated that both real and personal property could be included in
Class "I.14
There are, however, historical reasons for reading the statute
as excluding personal property from Class II. First, in the 1930's
it would have been difficult to imagine a widely used form of per-
sonal property that could be used exclusively for residential purposes.
Since the purpose of the statute was to give tax relief to home-
owners and farmers during the depression,'" and since few people
lived in mobile homes at that time,' 6 the natural result was that only
real estate was taxed in Class III. With the startling increase in the
9W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 5, § 3 (Michie 1966).
10 Tax Commissioner's Instructions to Assessors, Nov. 18, 1937 [reprinted
in 1 CCH SrATE TAx REp., W. VA. 22-112.55]
11 W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 8, § 5 (Michie 1966) (emphasis added).
12Id. (emphasis added).
'3W. VA. CoDE ch. 11, art. 8, § 5 (Michie 1966) (emphasis added).
' It could be argued that the legislature felt that only personal property
would be included in Class I and only real property would be included in
Class I, but the "[aUll property" wording of Class II is a strong indication that
it includes both types of property if they meet the other definitional require-
ments.
Is Philipps, The West Virginia Constitution and Taxation, 71 W. VA. L.
REv. 260, 281 (1969).
'6 Note, Toward an Equitable and Workable Program of Mobile Home
Taxation, supra note 3.
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number of people living in mobile homes,' 7 they were treated, when
placed on leased land, as other tangible personal property and taxed
in Class RI or IV.
A second reason for the prevalent taxing practice in West
Virginia may be found in the directives from the State Tax Commis-
sioner to the county assessors. The Tax Commissioner has the power
to furnish forms and instructions to the county assessors.'8 One of
these instructions establishes the guidelines for taxation of buildings
owned by a lessee, stating that they are to be taxed as personal
property if under the terms of the lease agreement they may be
removed by him.' 9 The West Virginia report form for personal prop-
erty and real estate provides no space for the declaration of Class 11
personal property.20 This, coupled with the Tax Commissioner's
instruction, would appear to leave the county assessor little choice
but to place an owner-occupied mobile home on leased property in
the traditional personal property classes, III and IV. The same logic
does not require placing mobile homes occupied by the owner of
the land in Classes III or IV since they are assessable as a part of
the real estate and can easily fit into the framework of the tax forms
now in use. Thus, while the prevailing method of classification in
West Virginia is contrary to express statutory language, it is not
historically illogical or unpredictable.
B. The Present Practice: Practical Consequences
The most widely used methods of taxing mobile homes in West
Virginia may be grouped into three categories. They are: (1) Place-
ment of all owner-occupied mobile homes whether on leased or owned
land in Class II; (2) placement of owner-occupied mobile homes
situated on leased land in Class I or IV and assessing them at the
same value as Class II mobile homes; and (3) placement of owner-
occupied mobile homes on leased land in Class I or IV but assess-
ing them at one-half the value of Class II mobile homes.2' Each of
these methods and its practical consequences will be discussed sepa-
rately.
17Id. Mobile homes now account for 75% of the sales of homes costing
less than $13,000. Bartke & Gage, Mobile Homes: Zoning and Taxation, 55
CoaNELL L. Rav. 491 n.23 (1970).18 W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 1, § 6 (Michie 1966).
19 Tax Commissioner's Instructions, supra note 10.20 WEsr VIRGMIA STATE TAX CoMMIssIoNER, L.G.R. 12:01 Rnv. (1971).
21 Survey, Appendix I.
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Seven of the forty-three counties responding to the survey assess
mobile homes in Class II as long as they are owner-occupied." These
seven counties have independently interpreted the statute and arrived
at the correct method of assessment. By doing so, they avoid the
problems inherent in the other methods of assessing mobile homes.
Although many of the assessors responding to the survey did
not specifically indicate their practice in assessment valuation, one
assessor did say that he assessed mobile homes on leased land placed
in Class III or IV at the same value as Class II mobile homes.
3 It
is possible that forty-one other counties may also do this.24 This
method of assessment denies some mobile home owners the benefit
of the lower tax rate in Class II and also results in many taxpayers
paying twice as much tax for living in the same kind of housing.
The inequity of this procedure can be easily illustrated. Taxpayer A
owns a mobile home worth $5000.00 and lives in it on land owned
by Taxpayer B. B lives next door in an identical mobile home located
on his own land. County X places A's mobile home in Class IV and
values it at 50% of its appraised value. This produces an assessed
valuation of $2500.00. His maximum tax rate is $2.00 per $100.00
assessed valuation.25 A's tax bill is $50.00. B, on the other hand, has
his home valued at $2500.00 but pays only $1.00 per $100.00 as-
sessed valuation26 since his home is Class II property. B's tax bill is
$25.00 or one-half that of A. The unfairness that results from using
this method could easily be eliminated by giving all mobile home
owners the benefits of Class 11.27
Six of the forty-three assessors answering the survey said that
they cut the assessment valuation of mobile homes placed in Class
III or IV to equalize the tax burden. 28 The rationale for doing so is
22 Survey, Appendix I. One of the seven counties requires the owner of the
mobile home to furnish the assessor with a copy of a one year or longer con-
tract or lease for the land before the mobile home is placed in Class HI.
23 Survey, Appendix I, Pocahontas County.24 Twenty-nine of the thirty-five counties that place mobile homes on leased
land in Class I or IV did not indicate which method of assessment valuation
they use. It is possible that they, as well as the twelve counties who did not
respond to the survey, could use this method.
25 W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 8, § 6 (Michie 1966).
26 Id.
27An argument might also be made that this practice also violates the
"equal protection" clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. See note 34, infra.28 Survey, Appendix I. It should be noted that the assessors in Marion and
Monongalia counties did not respond to the survey but were personally inter-
viewed and indicated that they use this method. Thus, eight counties are actually
known to be taxing mobile homes in this manner, but for purposes of docu-
[Vol. 75
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that all mobile home dwellers live in the same kind of housing, and
it is unfair for them to pay a different amount in taxes. Assessors,
therefore, cut the assessment valuation rate for mobile homes in
Class IV by 50%, causing taxes to equal those paid by the Class II
taxpayer. Thus, taxpayer A in the previous illustration would now
have his mobile home valued at 25% of its appraised value or
$1250.00. His taxes would be $25.00, or the same as those of tax-
payer B. Although this method successfully relieves any tax inequity,
it would appear to be unconstitutional.
The three general requirements governing property taxation in
the West Virginia constitution are: (1) That all taxes be "equal and
uniform"; (2) that property be "taxed in proportion to its value";
and (3) that "[n]o one species of property be taxed higher than any
other species of property of equal value ... ."29 For a tax to be
"equal and uniform" there must be uniformity in both the rate and
the mode of assessments. 0 The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals in Re: Stock Kanawha Valley Bank,3 interpreted the "no
one species" provision of the constitution as prohibiting the fixing of
the value of property by "an arbitrarily unequal assessment."3 2 The
court concluded that, "[w]hether one taxpayer is taxed twice as much
as the other by virtue of the imposition of a rate twice as high as the
other, or by an assessment twice as high as the other, it is forbidden
by Section 1, Article X, of the Constitution." A cutting of the
mentary accuracy the figures used are limited to the counties responding to the
written survey.
29 W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
30 Note, Equality and Uniformity in Property Taxes, 62 W. VA. L. REv. 70,
71 (1960).
31144 W. Va. 346, 109 S.E.2d 649 (1959). The Kanawha Valley Bank
appealed from a decision of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County that lowered
the value of the shares of bank stock but did not lower the assessor's percentage
of true and actual value for assessment purposes. Kanawha Valley Bank's stock
had been assessed at 100% of its true and actual value. The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals considered evidence that other property in Class I,
such as accounts receivable and notes receivable, were assessed at only 60% of
their true and actual value. Evidence that property in other classes was not
assessed at 100% of its true and actual value was essential to the decision.
32 Id. at 388, 109 S.E.2d at 673.33 Id. at 388, 109 S.E.2d at 672. For the constitutional provision to be
violated, Kanawha Valley Bank requires that there be the imposition of a higher
rate of assessment valuation on property of different classes and also that it be
done systematically. This position is made clear in syllabus point three, where
the court said:
A banking institution, whose shares of stock are assessed at one
hundred per centum of true and actual value, while other property in
the taxing unit is systematically assessed at a lower percentage of its
true and actual value, is entitled to have its assessment reduced to
6
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assessment rate on Class I or Class IV mobile homes to equalize
tax burdens falls within the area of constitutional prohibition enun-
ciated in Kanawha Valley Bank.1
4
C. Placing all Owner-Occupied Mobile Homes in Class II.
Is This the Ultimate Solution to Mobile Home
Taxation Problems in West Virginia?
Assessing all owner-occupied mobile homes as Class II property
would solve three problems now existing in West Virginia: (1) Ex-
plicit statutory language would no longer be ignored; (2) mobile
home owners would no longer be taxed differently for living in the
same type of housing; and (3) any constitutional objections to pres-
ent methods of mobile home taxation would be avoided. Still, any
inquiry into mobile home taxation would be incomplete without re-
vealing that several other problems would not be solved if all mobile
homes were taxed in Class II.
Since the argument for placing all owner-occupied mobile homes
in Class II is predicated on the theory that personal property can fit
within the definition of Class II, mobile homes under the present
statutory scheme, would still be personal property. The tax collector
comply with the provisions of Section 1, Article X, of the Constitution
of this State.
Id. at 346, 109 S.E.2d at 650 (emphasis added).34 1n Kanawha Valley Bank, the argument was advanced that the assess-
ment practice also violated the "equal protection" clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution and the "equal and uniform"
clause of the West Virginia constitution. The court considered a number of
West Virginia cases, which had been decided on the basis of the "equal and
uniform" clause, that allowed discrimination in assessment valuation rates be-
tween classes of property. It distinguished these cases from Kanawha Valley
Bank and said that it was not bound by stare decisis because none of them had
interpreted the application of the "no one species" clause. In doing so, the court
seemed to equate the state "equal and uniform" clause with the federal "equal
protection" clause by saying that, "[i]t is only when the taxpayer is discriminated
against within his own class that he may successfully invoke the protection of
the XIV Amendment." Id. at 386, 109 S.E.2d at 671. The court then said that
the state "equal and uniform" clause applies much the same standard to the
levying of all taxes in West Virginia. It, however, added that the "all property
shall be taxed in proportion to its value" clause and the "no one species" clause
of the West Virginia constitution impose a much stricter standard for equality
of taxation of property in this state than either the "equal protection" or 'equal
and uniform" clauses do. The decision in Kanawha Valley Bank, therefore,
requires equality in assessment valuation between, as well as within, classes of
property. Because of the nature of the decision, it is difficult to predict whether
an approach to a case of this type could be successful merely on the basis of the
"equal protection" or the "equal and uniform" clauses, but it appears that the
court might well have reached an opposite conclusion in Kanawha Valley Bank
if the "no one species" clause had not been the basis for the appeal. Id. at 386,
109 S.E.2d at 671.
[Vol. 75
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is thus deprived of two significant advantages that he has when deal-
ing with real estate as opposed to personal property. First, taxes are
a lien upon property."5 Second, real property may be sold for taxes.Y
Personal property taxes, on the other hand, are a debt personally
owed by the taxpayer. 7 To collect any delinquent personal property
taxes, either the person or some of his property must be within the
county to which they are owed. It has traditionally been argued that
since mobile homes are moveable and mobile home dwellers are
transitory, all one must do to avoid paying his taxes is move to an-
other county or state and take his mobile home with him.5 In spite
of increasing evidence that mobile home dwellers are no longer a
migratory group,39 it is still logical that owners of mobile homes
should not be given preferred status as Class II taxpayers while the
state is deprived of the traditional methods of collecting tax on real
estate. Any solution to the mobile home taxation problem must,
therefore, provide for a workable method of tax collection.
The current trend in mobile home taxation in other states is to
treat mobile homes as realty.4° In many instances this means that all
mobile homes are taxed to the owner of the land.4' This does not,
however, result in overtaxation of the landowner since it is relatively
easy for him to pass along the increase in taxes to the mobile home
owner as rent.4 Administratively, the problems of tax collection and
tax liens are eliminated by assessing all taxes to the landowner. Un-
fortunately, this taxation scheme could not be used in West Virginia
without major statutory revisions. West Virginia requires property
taxes to be paid by the party in possession of the property.43 As long
as mobile homes remain personal property, the taxes must be paid
by the owner of the mobile home rather than the owner of the land.
Furthermore, the landowner who leases land to mobile home owners
3
5W. VA. CODE ch. IlA, art. 1, § 2 (Michie 1966).
36W. VA. CODE ch. IlA, art. 2, § 10 (Michie 1966).
37W. VA. CODE ch. 11A, art. 2, § 2 (Michie 1966).38 Note, Toward an Equitable and Workable Program of Mobile Home
Taxation, supra note 3, at 714-15.39 Bartke & Gage, supra note 17, at 521; Note, Toward an Equitable and
Workable Program of Mobile Home Taxation, supra note 3, at 703-05.40 Bartke & Gage, supra note 17, at 520. See the survey of current statutes
dealing with mobile home taxation in other states in Appendix II.
41 The constitutionality of this method of mobile home taxation was upheld
in N.Y. Mobile Homes Ass'n v. Steckel, 9 N.Y.2d 533, 175 N.E.2d 151, 215
N.Y.S.2d 487 (1961), appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 150 (1962), and in Lantz
Appeal, 199 Pa. Super. 310, 184 A.2d 127 (1962).4 2 Bartke & Gage, supra note 17, at 524; Toward an Equitable and Work-
able Program of Mobile Home Taxation, supra note 3, at 715.
43 W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 3, § 8 (Michie 1966).
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does not use that land "exclusively for residential purposes. '44 It is
only the owner of the mobile home whose property is used for resi-
dential purposes. The argument for giving all mobile home owners
the advantages of Class II taxation would, therefore, become irrele-
vant in West Virginia if all taxes were assessed to the owner of the
land because he would not be entitled to Class 11 treatment. While
taxing all mobile homes as realty to the landowner would require
major statutory as well as constitutional revision, there is an alter-
native scheme that could effectively solve the tax collection problem
in West Virginia; it would not require a major statutory change.
As an adjunct to placing all owner-occupied mobile homes in
Class II, the legislature could implement a program of registration
of mobile homes as a pre-requisite to moving them on West Virginia's
highways.4 This program could include: (1) A requirement that
application to move a mobile home must be made with the State
Department of Motor Vehicles; (2) such application would have to
include whether the mobile home is being permanently moved from
the county in which it is presently located; (3) payment of all out-
standing taxes would be a precondition to the issuance of a permit
to move a mobile home; (4) a copy of the application for a moving
permit would be sent by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to the
assessor in the county in which the mobile home is presently located
(and to the assessor in the county in which the mobile home is to
be relocated if the application indicates that that county is within
West Virginia); (5) a small fee could be charged for the permit and
a decal to be displayed prominently on the mobile home while in
transit; and (6) the state police should be given the power to enforce
the act. Such an act would be in harmony with the present taxation
statutes in West Virginia and would definitely be an asset in discovery
and collection of mobile home taxes.
The solution to mobile home taxation problems in West Virginia
will be arrived at by balancing the optimum taxation scheme with
the method most practicable in view of the present state of the law
in West Virginia. In this context, a workable solution could be
achieved by requiring all owner-occupied mobile homes to be assessed
as Class 11 property and enacting a scheme of licensing permits as
suggested above. This would eliminate any tax inequities that now
exist. It would also solve tax collection problems without requiring
44W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 8, § 5 (Michie 1966).
45 An example of such a plan presently in use can be found in Kan. St.
Ann. § 8-143 (Supp. 1972).
[Vol. 75
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the legislature to upset the present tax structure and thus create un-
certainty as to the taxation of other forms of property.
West Virginia is one of the few states having no specific statu-
tory provisions on taxation of mobile homes.* The problems that
exist because of attempts to fit mobile homes into our present tax
structure have been explored. It is now time for the legislature to
act to correct both the present inequities in mobile home taxation
and the tax collection problems. Mobile homes are too widely used
as a form of housing to be ignored any longer.
H. REGULATION AND ZONING
With the tremendous increase in the sales of mobile homes in
the last several years, their regulation, as well as the problems in-
herent in this regulation, have become increasingly important.47 At-
tempted regulation varies from piecemeal legislation dealing specifi-
cally with mobile homes to comprehensive zoning plans that only
incidentally deal with them.
A survey of several West Virginia municipalities was taken to
ascertain the various methods of dealing with mobile home regula-
tion.48 Several general hypotheses may be drawn from the survey
information: (1) Most municipalities have adopted comprehensive
plans to regulate land use within their jurisdictions; (2) most of the
municipalities, even those without comprehensive plans, have regu-
lations specifically dealing with mobile homes; (3) most municipal-
ities do not allow single mobile homes on private lots; (4) most
municipalities allow mobile parks, but establish harsh zoning require-
ments that effectively exclude them; and, (5) the municipalities that
do allow mobile homes on private lots restrict them to areas that
are not primarily residential.
Since the primary means of regulation adopted by most of the
responding municipalities was zoning, this part of the article will be
directed essentially to that type of regulation.
46 Appendix U.
47 In 1953, 100,000 units valued at $100,000,000 were produced. In 1968,
350,000 units valued at $3,000,000,000 were produced. Bartke & Gage, supra
note 17, at 494.48 Most of the information was supplied in response to questionnaires sent
on January 18, 1973, to the larger municipal units within West Virginia.
Fourteen of the twenty cities asked responded to the survey.
10
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A. The Power To Zone
The power to zone is inherent as a police power of the state to
protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its citizens.
4
Since the power exists only in the state government, it must be dele-
gated to the local governing units before they may exercise it.10 The
West Virginia legislature has given municipal bodies this power.5'
This general grant of the police power by the state to the municipal-
ities includes the power to zone. There is also specific authority for
municipalities to pass ordinances concerning zoning and planning.52
These provisions must be in the form of an ordinance passed accord-
ing to the provisions of the municipal charter."3 The municipalities
were also given the power to regulate the erection, construction, re-
pair, or alteration of structures within the corporate limits.s4 Any of
these sources of authority may give the municipal bodies the power
to regulate mobile homes within their jurisdictions.
While the above statutes deal with the general authority of a
municipality to regulate or zone, there exist provisions in West Vir-
ginia for the creation of a local planning commission by governing
bodies of either municipalities or counties."5 When a local unit wishes
to establish such a planning commission, a strict statutory procedure
must be followed.56 The planning commission may then adopt and
49 See Anderson v. City of Wheeling, 150 W. Va. 689, 149 S.E.2d 243
(1966); G-M Realty, Inc. v. City of Wheeling, 146 W. Va. 360, 120 S.E.2d
249 (1961); State ex rel. Bear v. City of Beckley, 133 W. Va. 459, 57 S.E.2d
263 (1960); Carter v. City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
See also Davis v. City of Mobile, 245 Ala. 80, 16 So. 2d 1 (1943); City of
Howell v. Kaal, 341 Mich. 585, 67 N.W.2d 704 (1954); City of Omaha v.
Glissmann, 151 Neb. 895, 39 N.W.2d 828 (1949); Midgarden v. City of Grand
Forks, 79 N.D. 18, 54 N.W.2d 659 (1952); Davis v. McPherson, 132 N.E.2d
626 (Ohio Ct. of App. 1955); Storm Bros. v. Town of Balcones Heights, 239
S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
s0 It has been held that the police power of the municipality to regulate
building codes had to be delegated by the state, and by analogy it may be in-
ferred that the police power to zone must be delegated. State ex reL. Ammerman
v. City of Phillipi, 136 W. Va. 120, 65 S.E.2d 713 (1951). The charter or
subsequent enabling acts should be consulted in the locality where the desired
information is sought. The West Virginia law concerning municipalities can be
found in W. VA. CODE ch. 8 (Michie 1969 replacement volume). It may be
argued that the broad, general language of this chapter is sufficient to vest the
municipalities with the power to zone without specific enabling statutes. For
further discussion concerning this argument in other jurisdictions see B. HODFS
& G. ROBERSON, THE LAw OF MOBILE H-omEs 135 (2d ed. 1964).
5' W. VA. CODE ch. 8, art. 12, § 5(44) (Michie 1969 replacement volume).
52W. VA. CODE ch. 8, art. 11, § 3 (Michie 1969 replacement volume).
s3 Id.
54W. VA. CODE ch. 8, art. 12, § 13 (Michie 1969 replacement volume).
55 W. VA. CODE ch. 8, art. 24 (Michie 1969 replacement volume).
56 The planning commission is created by ordinance of the governing unit.
Id. § 1. In a municipality a commission must consist of from five to fifteen
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send to the local governing body a comprehensive plan." The adop-
tion and amendment process used by the planning commission must
also be strictly followed.,8 The creation of the comprehensive plan
does not affect the validity of any zoning ordinance passed prior to
its enactment. They continue in effect until specifically repealed by
the governing unit. 9 Several municipalities have availed themselves
of the above sections and have adopted comprehensive plans.60 The
members appointed by the governing unit, and they must be residents of the
municipality. Three-fifths of the commissioners must have been residents of the
municipality at least ten years before their appointment. One member from both
the administrative and governing bodies of the municipality must serve unless an
alternate is chosen each year. Id. § 5. The requirements are the same for the
county planning commission, except a county court member must sit on the
commission unless an alternate is chosen each year. Id. § 6. If a municipality is
located in a county that also has a commission, then a member of the county
planning commission must sit on the municipal commission as an advisory
member. Id. § 7. If so designated by both governing bodies, one planning com-
mission may serve for both the municipality and the county in which it is
located. Id. § 13.
57 The Code provides:
each comprehensive plan shall be made with the general purpose of
guiding and accomplishing a coordinated, adjusted and harmonious
development of the area which will, in accordance with present and
future needs and resources, best promote the health, safety, morals,
order, convenience, prosperity or general welfare of the inhabitants,
as well as efficiency and economy in the process of development, in-
cluding, among other things, such distribution of population and of
the uses of land for urbanization, trade, industry, habitation, recrea-
tion, agriculture, forestry and other purposes as will tend:
(1) To create conditions favorable to health, safety, transporta-
tion, prosperity, civic activities and recreational, educational and cul-
tural opportunities;
(2) To reduce the wastes of physical, financial or human re-
sources which result from either excessive congestion or excessive
scattering of population; and
(3) Toward the efficient and economic utilization, conservation
and production of the supply of food and water of drainage, sanitary
and other facilities and resources.
Id. § 16.
58 The planning commission must hold a public hearing before adoption of
the plan, and a thirty day notice of this hearing must be given in the local
newspaper. Id. § 18. After the hearing the commission may then adopt the plan
and submit it to the governing unit for passage. Id. § 19. At the first meeting of
the governing unit after the plan has been adopted by the commission, it is
presented for certification. If passed it becomes effective. Id. § 21. An amend-
ment to the plan must follow the same procedure as its adoption, except that
only a fifteen day public notice of a hearing is required. Id. § 23. Within sixty
days of the adoption of the plan, a petition may be presented calling for place-
ment of the plan before the voters. The petition must be signed by at least 15%
of the qualified voters residing within the jurisdiction determined by the number
of votes for governor at the last general election. The majority vote shall prevail.
Id. § 48.
69 ld. § 49.
60 In the survey conducted for this article, twelve municipal officials stated
that they did have comprehensive plans. These West Virginia municipalities are
as follows: Beckley, Bluefield, Charleston, Clarksburg, Dunbar, Huntington,
Martinsburg, Morgantown, Pt. Pleasant, St. Albans, South Charleston, and
12
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localities that do not have such a comprehensive plan may still regu-
late land use by other methods.6
B. Mobile Homes on Private Lots
The major limitation placed on mobile homes in most localities
is the prohibition of their use on single lots. Generally, placement of
mobile homes is restricted to established mobile home parks. Charles-
ton had allowed mobile homes in certain residential areas by means
of a "special use" permit, but because of the number of complaints
from surrounding property owners, it has now restricted mobile
homes solely to parks.62 This had been the course of action previously
taken by several municipalities in West Virginia.63 Other municipal-
ities have varied procedures restricting mobile homes on single lots.
A common procedure is to allow only "dwellings" in certain areas
and then specifically exclude mobile homes from the definition of a
"dwelling." 64 For this reason, the definitions of a zoning ordinance
are most important.
While several municipalities allow the placement of mobile
homes on private lots, they nevertheless place restrictions on them.
Beckley allows mobile homes to be placed on private lots only after
a "special use permit" has been obtained.65 The permit is good for
only six months and then must be renewed. To secure the permit, a
public hearing must be held, and the applicant must show compliance
Wheeling. Madison and Weston reported that they did not have such a plan.
These municipal officials also were asked if their county had such a plan.
Only Kanawha County has a plan, but Mason and Mineral counties are in the
process of adopting plans. The counties of Boone, Cabell, Harrison, Mercer,
Monogahia, and Ohio do not have such county plans.
6j While the municipalities of Madison and Weston do not have com-
prehensive plans to regulate the use of land, both have ordinances specifically
concerning mobile home locations.
62 Charleston, W. Va., Ordinance 1279, Nov. 6, 1972, revising CHALES-
TON, W. VA., Rv. ZONING ORDiNANcEs art. II, § 2.02; art. IV, § 4.06.03(4);
art. VIII, § 8.09.01 (1971).
63BLEFiELD, W. VA., CODE pt. 11, ch. 7, art. 34, § 2 (1958); DInmAR,
W. VA., ZoNING ORDINANCE art. VIII, §§ 1303, 1304 (19-); HUNTINGTON,
W. VA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 9 (1970); MARTiNsBuRO, W. VA., CODE § 625.1
(19-). While not citing a specific municipal ordinance, the responses from Pt.
Pleasant and St. Albans indicated that they do not allow mobile homes on
private lots. Although South Charleston does not have a specific prohibition,
their response to the survey indicates they do not allow them on private lots
by not stating where and how they may be parked.
"This was the approach adopted by the City of Clarksburg in September,
1969, when it amended its definition section to exclude mobile homes as a
"dwelling." Clarksburg, W. Va., Ordinance -, Sept. -, 1969. Charleston also
adopted this approach by excluding mobile homes from the definition of "in-
dustrialized housing." Charleston, W. Va., Ordinance 1279, Nov. 6, 1972.
65 BEcKLEy, W. VA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 9(E) (19-).
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with certain sanitary requirements.6b In all other instances mobile
homes are permitted only in proper mobile home parks. Although
Madison does not have a zoning ordinance, it does have a specific
ordinance dealing with mobile homes.67 At least five days prior to
installation, a detailed plan must be submitted to the city for review
and approval. If approved the city will then issue a permit. For the
mobile home to be allowed for more than thirty days, it must be
enclosed between the ground and floor with stone or metal to reduce
the possibility of fire.68 Weston allows mobile homes only in non-
residential areas of the city. 9 When a person wishes to locate a mo-
bile home in a non-residential area, he must submit the written ap-
proval of seventy-five percent of the owners of real property within
three hundred feet of his boundary line in every direction.70 Wheeling
allows the placement of mobile homes in certain designated zones
within the city.7'
These regulations and prohibitions tend to make mobile homes
located on private lots within municipalities rare. Placement is either
entirely prohibited or is restricted to such an extent that compliance
is impractical.
C. Mobile Home Park Regulation
Since the placement of mobile homes on private lots has been
nearly eliminated in most intrastate jurisdictions, mobile home park
regulation has become a primary concern. The regulations, in most
instances, are prohibitive in nature. Many require mobile home parks
to have a minimum acreage requirement which, coupled with sewage
and other requirements, cannot be met in most areas of the munici-
palities. Where mobile home parks are allowed, they are usually in
the least desirable areas of the municipality.72 This factor, as well as
66 Id.
67 MADIsoN, W. VA., MOBILE HOME ORDINANcE § 4.2 (1972).
68 Id.
69 Weston defines a residential area as "any block or area in the city which
has fifty percent or more of its buildings occupied and used for residential or
dwelling purposes, or any vacant land which has been platted or laid off for
residential subdivision purposes, or which adjoins a residential area." WESTON,
W. VA., CODE ch. 15, § 2 (1970).
70 Id. § 6.
71 These zones include "I-I," which is the light industry zone, and
"R-4," a residential zone. WHEELiNG, W. VA., ZONING ORDINANCE arts. 1333.04,
1333.10 (19-).72 Interestingly, zones where mobile homes are allowed are almost always
those limited to business, commerce, or industry. Several noted authors on the
subject of mobile homes have pointed out that from both the sociological and
public interest standpoints it is wrong to relegate the four million mobile home
14
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limits on the yard space per unit, is not a conducive environment for
raising a family.
While the regulation of mobile home parks is generally a local
concern, there are state-wide regulations. The most encompassing
state regulatory program was set forth by the West Virginia State
Department of Health, which has established the minimum require-
ments for setting up a mobile home park.3 These regulations apply
only to mobile home parks and developments and not to single mo-
bile homes on private property. The regulations define a mobile home
as a "manufactured relocatable living unit designed and intended for
year round occupancy."74 A mobile home park is:
Any site, area, tract or parcel of land upon which two or
more mobile homes used or occupied for dwelling purposes
are parked either free of charge or for monetary consider-
ation and shall include any roadway, building, structure, in-
stallation, enclosure, or vehicle used or intended for use as
a part of the facilities of said mobile home park.75
A mobile home development is a "contiguous parcel of land sub-
divided into individual lots, each lot individually owned and intended
or utilized as the site for placement of a mobile home and its facili-
ties."76 The regulations encompass a comprehensive list of subjects
including such items as water supply;" sewage systems;78 management
buildings and other community service facilities;" electrical distribu-
dwellers to living and growing up in commercial and industrial areas. See
B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, supra note 50.
73These regulations were adopted under the power granted to the Board of
Public Health in W. VA. CODE ch. 16, art. 1 (Michie 1969 replacement volume).
Section 3 states:
It shall have the power to inspect, and to make and enforce, for the
protection of the general public health, reasonable rules and regula-
tions to control the sanitary condition of... tourist camps, all other
places open to the general public and inviting public patronage or
public assembly. .. "
The mobile home park regulations became effective on Oct. 1, 1971. They be-
came part of the West Virginia Board of Health Code. "These regulations
establish the rules and regulations of the West Virginia Board of Health gov-
erning the construction, installation, and operation of mobile home parks and
mobile home park developments." W. VA. BD. OF HEALTH CODE ch. 1, art. 7b,
§ 1.1 (1971). These regulations were supplemented by DivisION OF SANrrARY
ENGINEERING, WEST VIRGINIA DEP'T OF HEALTH, DESIGN, INFORMATION AND
PROCEDURAL MANUAL FOR MOBILE HOME PARKS (1971).
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tion systems;80 solid waste handling;8' registration of occupants;82 and
permits, hearings, notices and orders. 3 One of the more stringent
requirements calls for a minimum of three thousand square feet for
each mobile home space.
84
To receive a permit from the Department of Health to build a
mobile home park, the applicant must file specific plans and specifi-
cations at least forty-five days prior to the date the permit is desired.
Although these regulations do not apply to mobile home parks exist-
ing at the time the regulations were promulgated, they do apply to
any "construction or installation" occuring after the effective date.8"
To supplement the regulations of the Department of Health,
most municipalities also have their own regulations for mobile home
parks. Exercising its statutory authority, Beckley has established an
"R-4" zone, which is called a "mobile home district" within which
mobile home parks may be developed. The ordinance sets forth spe-
cific requirements that must be met before the development will be
permitted.8 7 In Bluefield, the "business districts" are the only areas
where mobile home parks are allowed.8 It also sets requirements for
the size and general character of lots within each park. 9 The "B-2"
zone, a business district, and the "I-1" and "I-2" zones, industrial
districts, are the zones where mobile home parks are allowed in
Clarksburg. ° Dunbar allows the parks to be developed only within
their "R-2" districts as a "special exception" with specific area re-
quirements. 9' Charleston has some of the most comprehensive and
80 Id. § 10.0.
81 Id. § 11.0.
82 Id. § 16.0.
8 3 d § 4.0.
84 Id. § 6.2.1.1.
85 Id. § 4.1.3.86 Id. § 4.2.6. While the Department of Health does regulate mobile home
parks in a most inclusive manner, there are other states agencies involved,
e.g., the state fire marshal administers certain regulations that could affect
mobile home developments.87 In Beckley, West Virginia, there is a minimum size requirement of six
acres with no more than eight mobile homes per acre. There are also require-
ments as to foundations, access, and plumbing. BEcKLEY, W. VA., ZoNING, Oari-
NANCE § 9 (19-).
88 Bluefield, W. Va., Ordinance to Amend BLuEFmLD, W. VA., CODE
pt. 11, ch. 7, art. 34, § 1 (1958), Jan. 9, 1973.89 In Bluefield, West Virginia, each space must be at least four thousand
square feet, with at least a twenty foot open space between trailers. BLUEFIELD,
W. VA., CODE pt. 11, ch. 7, art. 34, § 9 (1958).
90 In Clarksburg, West Virginia, at least five acres with 2500 square feet
per stand is required. The mobile home park must be convenient to major
highways and have adequate sewage. CLARSBURG, W. VA., ZoNiNG ORDINANCE,
Special Exception Section (1961).91In Dunbar, West Virginia, a minimum of two acres with a three thou-
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prohibitive restrictions existing in the state.92 Two residential zones,
two business zones and the three industrial zones are allowed to be
developed for mobile homes in Huntington, West Virginia, as "a
special exception." 93 The "special exception" method is the means
adopted by Martinsburg in deciding which areas are allowed to
have mobile home parks. All plans must be submitted to the planning
commission before a permit will be issued.9 4 Wheeling has a "planned
residential zone" where mobile home parks may be located.93 Most
other jurisdictions in West Virginia also regulate mobile home parks.
These regulations must meet the minimum standards set by the West
Virginia Department of Health, and if there are conflicts, the Depart-
ment's regulations will prevail.
96
D. Enforcement and Appeals
The municipality has several statutory remedies against violators
of the comprehensive plans. Any violation is considered a misde-
meanor subject to a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than
three hundred dollars.97 Any buildings erected in violation of such
plans are considered nuisances, and the owner is liable for maintain-
ing a common nuisance.9 The planning commission, the board of
zoning appeals, or "any designated enforcement official" may seek
an injunction in the circuit court to restrain any violation of a zoning
ordinance adopted under these provisions. They may also seek a
mandatory injunction directing that any structures in violation be
removed.99
sand square foot per trailer space is required. There are specific set-back and
parking spaces per unit requirements. DUNBAR, W. VA., ZONING ORDINANCE
art. XIII, § 1305 (19-).92 CHARLESTON, W. VA., REvisED ZONING ORDINANCE art. VIII (1971).
The minimum acreage for any development is eight acres. To begin operation,
a minimum of fifty spaces must be ready for occupancy. Standards set by the
Health Director must be met for sanitary facilities and water supply. A mini-
mum occupancy period of thirty days must be met by each resident. Id.
93 HUNTINGTON, W. VA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 20 (1970). The require-
ments are set forth in great detail, including a minimum of two acres and
twenty-five hundred square feet per space. This ordinance is an example of
regulations used effectively to exclude mobile homes. It would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to find a two acre site that would meet the other
requirements of the section. Interview with Gary L. Bunn, Planning Director,
Huntington City Planning Comm'n, in Huntington, W. Va., Jan. 2, 1973.
94The requirements in Martinsburg, West Virginia, include a minimum
of five acres with twenty-four hundred square feet per space. MARTINSDuIRG,
W. VA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 625 (19-).
95 A detailed procedure is set forth to obtain a permit. WHEELING, W. VA.,
ZONING ORDINANCE § 1333.05 (1970).
96W. VA. CODE ch. 16, art. 1, § 3 (Michie 1969 replacement volume).
97W. VA. CODE ch. 8, art. 24, § 68 (Michie 1969 replacement volume).
98 1d. § 66.
99 Id. § 67.
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There is a procedure for granting special exceptions to non-
conforming uses."'a The board of zoning appeals was established to
handle appeals from administrative decisions of the planning body
and to grant exceptions from the zoning ordinances. 0 In the circuit
court of the county where the property is located a further appeal
may be taken. Any person aggrieved by "any decision or order" of
the board of zoning appeals may seek review by certiorari.0 2 The
presiding judge may call witnesses or decide the case on the evidence
and facts in the petition. Under no circumstances will a trial de novo
be granted.'0 3 As in all other civil cases, findings may be appealed to
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.04
There is little case law concerning matters of zoning in general,
and there is none concerning zoning of mobile homes. As previously
stated, West Virginia accepts the principle that municipalities, with
proper enabling legislation, have the right to zone within their police
powers.'0
Based upon the police power theory, the West Virginia court
has stated a reluctance to review zoning ordinances for reasonableness
and has held that there is a presumption in their favor.'0 6 The "fairly
debatable" rule was adopted as the standard to measure the validity
of zoning ordinances. The rule states that "if the decision of the zon-
ing authorities is fairly debatable the courts will not interfere with
such decision."' 0 7 This standard indicates that if the city is able to
10oThe municipal or county comprehensive plan may not prevent a situ-
ation that was present when the ordinance became effective. Therefore all
mobile homes in existence when the ordinance became effective are permitted.
Id. § 50. The term "non-conforming use" refers to an activity or type of dwell-
ing that is not authorized for that particular zone.
101 W. VA. CODE ch. 8, art. 24, H9 51, 55 (Michie 1969 replacement vol-
ume). Section 55 states:
In exercising its powers and authority, the board of zoning appeals
may reverse or affirm, in whole or in part, or may modify the order,
requirement, decision or determination appealed from, as in its opin-
ion ought to be done in the premises, and to this and shall have all
the powers and authority of the official or board from whom or which
the appeal is taken.
102 "Every decision or order of the board of zoning appeals shall be sub-
ject to review by certiorari." Id. § 59. This section does not authorize cer-
tiorari to review the adoption of a zoning ordinance by a municipal governing
body. Garrison v. City of Fairmont, 150 W. Va. 498, 147 S.E.2d 397 (1966).
103 W. VA. CODE ch. 8, art. 24, § 64 (Michie 1969 replacement volume).
104 Id. § 65.
105 See the text accompanying notes 49 and 50 supra.
10& "The enactment of a zoning ordinance of a municipality being a legis-
lative function, all reasonable presumptions should be indulged in favor of
its validity." G-M Realty, Inc. v. City of Wheeling, 146 W. Va. 360, 361,
120 S.E.2d 249, 250 (1961).
1
07 Anderson v. City of Wheeling, 150 W. Va. 689, 698, 149 S.E.2d 243,
249 (1966); Carter v. City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 905, 54 S.E.2d 747,
761 (1949).
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raise any question or any type of justification for the ordinance, the
court will not review its validity. This places a tremendous burden
on the party seeking to challenge the ordinance.
Charges that a zoning ordinance is discriminatory or arbitrary
have not met with much success in West Virginia. In G-M Realty,
Inc. v. City of Wheeling, the court held that if a particular property
owner was treated no differently from other property owners and if
the ordinance in question bore a substantial relation to the health,
safety, morals, and general welfare of the people, it would not be
considered discriminatory or arbitrary." 8 This position was reaffirmed
five years later in Anderson v. City of Wheeling.09 These cases give
the impression that a comprehensive zoning scheme is valid if not
invidiously applied.
The seemingly appealing arguments in G-M Realty, Inc., were
that the property value had been decreased and that the owner was
being denied the free and independent use of the property." 0 These
arguments were not given much support; the court felt that the mu-
nicipal police power superceded these property rights. The court bal-
anced the interests to reach its conclusion.
Several novel approaches have been successful in other jurisdic-
tions for allowing mobile homes on single lots even though they have
been specifically excluded by some regulation. In Douglas Township
v. Badman an ordinance excluded mobile homes from private lots."'
The Pennsylvania court stated that by removing its wheels and plac-
ing it on a foundation, a mobile home became a single-family dwell-
ing which would be allowed under the ordinance. The Washington
court, in State v. Work, went even further." 2 In Work, the relevant
statute stated that any "form of vehicle even though immobilized"
was excepted from the definition of a "building.""' 3 The owner had
removed the tongue, axles, and wheels and had placed it on a block
foundation. The court held that it had all the characteristics of a
108 146 W. Va. 360, 364, 120 S.E.2d 249, 253 (1961). This traditional
equal protection argument has not met with much success. See B. HoDEs &
G. RoBERsoN, supra note 50 at 133-200; Bartke & Gage, supra note 17 at 496-
514; Note, Regulation of Mobile Homes, 13 SYRAcusE L. Rnv. 125, 127-33
(1961). For the procedure see 16 AM. JuR. Thnms 99 (1969).
109 150 W. Va. 689, 149 S.E.2d 243 (1966).
110146 W. Va. 360, 120 S.E.2d 249 (1961).
"' 206 Pa. Super. 390, 213 A.2d 88 (1965).
11275 Wash. 2d 212, 449 P.2d 806 (1964).
13 Id. at 214, 449 P.2d at 808. See also City of Sioux Falls v. Cleveland,




Summers et al.: Housing--Mobile Homes--Some Legal Questions
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1973
STUDENT NOTES
single family dwelling and, therefore, would be allowed. The per-
manence of the structure was the issue in Bowman v. Holsopple.
The Indiana court allowed a mobile home to be installed in a district
even though there was a zoning ordinance specifically excluding
them.' 4 The other extreme of this semantic game is exemplified by
the position taken in Massachusetts. Regardless of alterations that
make the mobile home permanent, it will always be considered mo-
bile and will never conform to the definition of a dwelling."15
E. Pros and Cons of Mobile Homes
Owing to their construction, a great many mobile homes can be
placed within a minimum amount of space. This could cause the
overloading of sewer and other public utilities, neighborhood schools,
and streets. Still, large apartment complexes create the same prob-
lems and are allowed to exist in certain residential areas. Although
the mobile home, with its box-like appearance, may offend the aes-
thetic configuration of certain areas, it could improve the appearance
of the more ran-down areas of many municipalities. The arguments
presented against mobile homes are solid ones for regulation but not
for complete prohibition.
With the growing importance of the mobile home in the housing
industry, it is imperative that the municipalities take another look at
the ideas and philosophies behind their zoning ordinances and change
them to mirror the existing needs of the population. Zoning ordi-
nances should be concerned with regulation of mobile homes rather
than prohibition. In West Virginia, this change will have to be initi-
ated by the local governing units since the courts have shown a re-
luctance to interfere with local regulations.
III. WARRANTIES
In addition to the questions of taxation and zoning, other com-
mon legal problems arise in the mobile home field.'" 6 These disputes
are usually resolved by the application of common law principles,
statutes, or the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter referred to as
the UCC]."17 For example, if a warranty problem exists, the attorney
14292 N.E.2d 274 (Ind. 1973).
" tTown of Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333
(1962).
16 For a discussion of the various legal problems that arise in mobile
home living, see B. HODnS & G. RoBERsoN, supra note 50, at 201-61.
17 Presently, every state except Louisiana has adopted the Uniform Corn-
20
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will apply the same UCC rules that are used for other personal prop-
erty."18 The mobile home buyer may recover from the dealer for a
breach of any express' 9 or implied warranties, including a warranty
of merchantability'20 and of reasonable fitness for a particular pur-
pose.' Some illustrations are pertinent. Two examples of recovery
by mobile home buyers based on warranties of merchantability are
Nettles v. Imperial Distributors, Inc.'2 and George v. Willman.'23 In
Nettles, the plaintiffs recovered from the seller for property damage
and personal injuries when the gas cooking stove in their mobile home
exploded. The written contract of sale contained no express warran-
ties. However, the court found a breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability because the stove lacked an adaptor. It further found
that a normal examination of the mobile home by the buyer prior to
the sale would not have revealed the defect.'
2 4
mercial Code [hereinafter referred to as the UCC]. West Virginia's provisions
may be found in the W. VA. CODE ch. 46 (Michie 1966).
118The UCC should always be checked first to see if its provisions are
applicable. General principles of law and equity are used to supplement the
UCC unless they are displaced by a particular provision. UCC § 1-103. For
example, UCC § 9-313 leaves the definition of a fixture to pre-UCC law.
19UCC § 2-313.
120 UCC § 2-314 provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified . . .a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind ...
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description; and ...
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used ....
121 UCC § 2-315 provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next
section [§ 2-3161 an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.
UCC § 2-315, Comment 2, explains the difference between this section
and the implied waranty of merchantability in UCC § 2-314:
A "particular purpose" differs from the ordinary purpose for which
the goods are used in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer
which is peculiar to the nature of his business whereas the ordinary
purposes for which goods are used are those envisaged in the concept
of merchantability and go to uses which are customarily made of the
goods in question.
122 152 W. Va. 9, 159 S.E.2d 206 (1968) reviewed in 70 W. VA. L. Rnv.
467 (1968).
123 379 P.2d 103 (Alas. 1963).
124 Athough the provisions of the UCC were not applicable to this case
(the sale was made prior to West Virginia's adoption of the UCC), the
result under § 2-316(3)(b) would have been the same:
[W]hen the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the
goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused
to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to
[Vol. 75
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In George, the buyer recovered damages for a fire caused by
loose fuel fittings located near the furnace in his mobile home. This
defect existed at the time of sale. Again, the primary issue was
whether a reasonable inspection by the buyer would have revealed
the defect. These cases and the UCC' 25 indicate that a prospective
buyer should make a careful examination of the mobile home before
entering into a sales contract.
In Cabana Homes, Inc. v. Coward26 and Dougherty v. Pe-
trero,'27 the courts decided that a warranty of fitness for habitation' 28
was applicable to mobile homes. Cabana held that a buyer is not
required to examine the roof of a mobile home to make certain it is
properly built. Testimony that during the fifty-two days of occupancy
the trailer roof leaked on six different occasions and caused extensive
damages was sufficient to sustain a finding of breach of warranty.
This same warranty of fitness was applied to the sale of a second-
hand mobile home in Dougherty, a case decided in Louisiana where
the UCC has not been adopted. The implied warranty of merchant-
ability would arise under the UCC only where the seller is a "mer-
chant with respects to goods of that kind." Thus, a buyer who pur-
chases a second-hand mobile home from a private individual would
have no such warranty of merchantability.' 29 However, the official
comments point out that a non-merchant seller has a duty to disclose
any material and hidden defects which are within his knowledge.'30
One of the most common defenses to an action based on breach
defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have
revealed to him.
West Virginia's position prior to the UCC was that no implied warranty
of merchantability could exist if the buyer had an opportunity to inspect and
the seller was neither a grower or manufacturer. Nettles was distinguished by
the court since it involved a missing part and not a defective part. See 70
W. VA. L. Rnv. 467 (1968).
125 UCC § 2-316(3) (b).
26472 S.W.2d 709 (Ark. 1971).
127 240 La. 287, 123 So. 2d 60 (1960).
128 UCC § 2-314(2) (c) provides that merchantable goods must be fit to
be used for their ordinary purposes, which in the case of a mobile home
would be habitation. A growing number of jurisdictions have relaxed or
completely abandoned the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of a new
house. The vendor of a new dwelling may be liable for damages caused by
the defective condition of the house on the theory of breach of an implied
warranty of habitability. 71 W. VA. L. Rv. 87 (1968). This warranty has
not been applied to mobile homes. Although a mobile home may be a dwell-
ing, it is nonetheless considered to be personalty and is governed by the UCC.
129 UCC § 2-314, Comment 3, provides: "A person making an isolated
sale of goods is not a 'merchant' within the meaning of the full scope of
this section and, thus, no warranty of merchantability would apply......
130 Id.
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of warranty is the vendor's disclaimer of warranty. An attempt by a
dealer to disclaim all warranties must include a provision that spe-
cifically refers to implied warranties. 3' The UCC provides definite
requirements that are helpful in drafting a binding disclaimer.' In
Stryker v. Rusch,3 3 the defendant dealer alleged that all warranties
were expressly excluded from the contract by the following provision:
"This writing. . . constitutes the entire agreement between the parties
hereto, there being no warranties or representations by the seller ex-
cept as set forth herein."'3 4 The court held that this language applied
only to previous consensual arrangements between the parties, such
as express warranties. Implied warranties were not the subject of
negotiation or agreement and, therefore, were not revoked. The same
result would have been reached under UCC section 2-316(2) "1 be-
cause merchantability was not mentioned in the disclaimer. The con-
tract in Stryker would have been effective under the UCC only to
exclude all implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose. "
Liability for breach of warranty was long held to require privity
of contract between the parties, and recovery against the manufacturer
by a sub-vendee was permitted only for negligence.' However, a
growing number of courts have abandoned this concept, and the
trend of decisions is away from the requirement of privity38 Except
for the limited effect of section 2-318, 31 the UCC does not alter the
'31 Payne v. Valley Motor Sales, Inc., 146 W. Va. 1063, 124 S.E.2d 622
(1962); Wade v. Chariot Trailer Co., 331 Mich. 576, 50 N.W.2d 162 (1951);
Nichols Bus & Trailer Co. v. Fuller, 198 Miss. 230, 22 So. 2d 243 (1945).
132 UCC § 2-316(2), provides:
mo exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or
any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case
of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and
conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is
sufficient if it states, for example, that "there are no warranties
which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
'33 187 N.Y.S.2d 663, 8 App. Div. 2d 244 (1959).
134 Id. at 664, 8 App. Div. 2d at 245.
135 Cases cited note 131 supra.
136 Id. See also Lorensen, Product Liability and Disclaimers in West
Virginia, 67 W. VA. L. REv. 291 (1965).
137 In Smith v. Squire Homes, Inc., 329 N.Y.S.2d 243, 38 App. Div. 2d
879 (1972), the owner of a mobile home that was destroyed by fire was not
allowed to recover from the maker of the defective furnace on the theory of
breach of implied warranty. Since the owner was not in privity with the fur-
nace maker, the proper theory would have been negligence.
138 Berry v. American Cynamid Co., 341 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1965) (de-
fendant's defective oral polio vaccine administered to plaintiff by his phy-
sician); Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959) (manu-
facturer assumed direct contractual obligations toward the mobile home buyer
by its warranty policy).
139 UCC § 2-318, provides:
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requirement of privity. The official UCC comment declares that a
neutral position is taken on this point. 40 Whether privity is required
is to be determined by the law of the state where the sale is made,
4 '
rather than by the law of the state where subsequent damages are
incurred. 
4 2
In addition to the remedy based on breach of warranty for dam-
ages, the aggrieved mobile home owner may have an alternative re-
course. Upon breach of warranty by a mobile home dealer, the buyer
may rescind the contract and be restored to his former position or
affirm the contract and recover damages. 43 Since only one redress
can be obtained,'" the buyer must be careful to elect the remedy he
desires to pursue. An example of the consequences of improper elec-
tion is Shreve v. Casto Trailer Sales, Inc. 41 In Shreve, the buyer
elected to rescind his purchase contract after living in the mobile
home for five months. He was denied relief because he failed to act
within a reasonable time after his discovery of the defect. The court
also noted that a clear and timely notice to rescind the contract of
sale must be given to the seller before a valid rescission can be
granted. Both of these requirements are also included in the UCC.1 46
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a
guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may
use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in per-
son by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section.
14o UCC § 2-318, Comment 3, provides:
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions
the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the
section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his
buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
14' The West Virginia position as to the privity requirement is unclear.
Dicta in Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Mkt., 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785 (1939),
indicates that privity is required. However, Kyle v. Swift & Co., 229 F.2d
887 (4th Cir. 1956), implies that the absence of privity is no bar to an
action based on breach of warranty in West Virginia. For a more complete
discussion of the problem, see 68 W. VA. L. REv. 95 (1965).
1
4 2 McCrossin v. Hicks Chevrolet, Inc., 248 A.2d 917 (D.C. Ct. App.
1969).
'
43 See generally 12 S. W.LisroN, A Tr"ATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
Tmcrs §§ 1454-85 (3d ed. 1972).
144 Rescission and damages are inconsistent remedies. A suit for damages
assumes that the contract is still in existence and can therefore be sued upon.
In suing for rescission, the plaintiff is alleging that he is justified in avoiding
or terminating the contract and demanding the return of his payments. 12
S. WmLLsTON, supra note 143; RESTATEmENT OF CONTRACTS § 381 (1933).
145 150 W. Va. 669, 149 S.E.2d 238 (1966).
14
6 UCC § 2-601 (1), provides: "Rejection of goods must be within a
reasonable time after their delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the
buyer seasonably notifies the seller."
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The buyer's proper action would have been a damage suit for breach
of warranty.'
47
In Eggen v. M. & K. Trailers & Mobile Home Brokers, Inc.,"'
however, although the buyer had lived in the mobile home for seven
months, his letter notifying the dealer of rescission was held timely.
The facts in Shreve were essentially analogous to those in Eggen.
The only reasonable explanation for the difference in these cases is
the problem of interpreting the term "reasonable time." Therefore,
the only safe advice for a mobile home owner who desires to rescind
his purchase contract is to notify the seller of this election immedi-
ately.
It should be reiterated that contractual problems concerning
mobile homes are usually very similar to those involving other per-
sonal property. The attorney should find the appropriate UCC pro-
vision, if there is one, and supplement it with any necessary principles
of law or equity. Trailer warranties present no unusual problems in
this regard.
IV. FIXTURES
One of the problems in the area of mobile home living concerns
whether a mobile home is to be considered a fixture. 49 This deter-
mination becomes important with regard to the sale of land, priority
of competing security interests, landlord and tenant relations, home-
stead rights, and insurance contracts, among other things.50 Unfortu-
nately, the various states differ greatly as to what constitutes a fixture.
The leading American fixture case of Teaff v. Hewitt5' rejected the
harsh English attachment rule' 2 and based its decision as to when a
chattel becomes realty upon "the intention of the party making the
47 12 S. WMLSTON, supra note 143.
148 29 Colo. App. 177, 482 P.2d 435 (1971).
149A fixture is an article of personal property that, while retaining its
separate physical identity, is brought upon and annexed to real property. The
term implies something having possible existence apart from realty, but which
by annexation is assimilated into realty. See generally 5 AMmuCAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 19 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); L. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY
§§ 137-57 (2d ed. 1955); 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §§ 651-60 (1971);
1 G. THOMPsON, REAL PROPERTY §§ 55-81 (1964); 2 H. TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY §§ 606-26 (3rd ed. 1939).
150The determination may also be important in the assessment of ad
valorem property taxes. See text accompanying note 9.
's' 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853).
152The English courts generally held that anything connected to the free-
hold was realty, regardless of the parties' intention. See Niles, The Rationale
of the Law of Fixtures: English Cases, 11 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 560 (1934).
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annexation."'5 Modem courts have extended the standard so that now
the usual criteria include: (1) Actual physical annexation to the
realty; (2) application or adaptation to the use or purpose to which
the realty is devoted; and (3) an intention on the part of the person
making the annexation to make a permanent accession to the free-
hold.'14 The actual intention of the parties is usually the controlling
consideration when the matter is litigated.'55 West Virginia has adopted
this test in determining whether a particular item is to be deemed a
fixture.' 56
The distinction between a fixture and other kinds of property
becomes important with regard to the purchase or sale of land. The
problem usually revolves around whether a mobile home situated on
the property in question is to be included in the buy-sell agreement. In
resolving this question, an important factor to be considered in con-
junction with the above tests' s7 is whether the mobile home owner also
owns the land. For example, in Gomez v. Dykes,'55 the mobile home in
question was owned by an employee of the vendor. The mobile home
was temporarily attached to a house on a ranch when the ranch was
sold. Due to the employment relationship, the court found no intent
by the employee to make a permanent accession to the freehold.' 9
Accordingly, the court held that the mobile home was not a fixture
and did not pass with the land to the vendee."10
On the other hand, when the land and the mobile home attached
to it are owned by the same person, the mobile home becomes a fixture
if the owner considers it a permanent accesion to the freehold. Such a
situation arose in George v. Commercial Credit Corp.,"' where a
trustee in bankruptcy attacked the rights of the holder of a real estate
mortgage. The trustee claimed that a mobile home on the land was
153 The court held that this intention could be "inferred from the nature
of the article affixed, the relation and situation of the party making the
annexation, the structure and mode of annexation, and the purpose or use for
which the annexation has been made." 1 Ohio St. at 530.
'54 George v. Commercial Credit Corp., 440 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1971).
'S Id.
156 "If the first two of these elements concur, that is, its attachment to
the real estate and its adaptability to the purposes for which the real estate
is being used, it will be presumed that the party attaching it intended that it
should be a part of the real estate, unless a contrary intention appears from
the conduct of the parties in relation to it." Snuffer v. Spangler, 79 W. Va.
628, 638, 92 S.E. 106, 110 (1917).
7 See text following note 153.
158 89 Ariz. 171, 359 P.2d 760 (1961).
'59 Id. at 175, 359 P.2d at 763.
160 Id. at 177, 359 P.2d at 764.
61 440 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1971).
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personalty and that the mortgagee had no interest in it. The court held
for the mortgagee, finding that the bankrupt's actual intention was to
affix the mobile home to the land as a permanent residence. Besides
considering concurrent ownership of the mobile home and land, the
court noted that the bankrupt had applied for a building permit that
required the erection of a concrete slab foundation within one year.
In addition to purchasing a homeowner's insurance policy and request-
ing the seller to remove the wheels, he had never moved the trailer
from his five-acre plot."1
2
A more difficult situation arises when the intention of the mobile
home owner is not clear, even though he may also own the land.
Clifford v. Epsten"3 involved a mobile home that doubled as a tem-
porary office for a mobile home park and a home for the manager-
owner. When the mobile home park was sold, the vendor removed
the trailer from the premises. Although the test of adaptability for
use"64 was satisfied, the court had some difficulty with the tests of
attachment' 6 and intention. 66 In fact, the court inferred a lack of in-
tention from the nature of the attachment.' 67 Additionally, the vendor
testified that he never intended the trailer to be a part of the realty and
that it had been for sale at all times. He further testified that had he
sold the trailer, he intended to convert a building on the premises into
an office. Using the inference of lack of intention to corroborate the
vendor's testimony, the court refused to grant a rescission of the con-
tract for sale of the park.
61
It is clear that a prospective land purchaser who expects the con-
tract of sale to include a mobile home on the land should take special
precautions. If there is any doubt about the specificity of the contract,
the buyer should include the mobile home in the list of property
covered. Thus, the buyer avoids ever having to determine whether the
mobile home was a fixture.
More complex problems arise in the area of security interests in
mobile homes. Since the mobile home often becomes a fixture, the
creditor may have to cope with the UCC provisions relating to fix-
16
2 Id. at 554.
163 106 Cal. App. 2d 221, 234 P.2d 687 (1951).





6 7 The mobile home was attached to the land only by plumbing and
electrical connections, consisting of hose and tubing, which were detachable
in two minutes. There were no permanent plumbing fixtures. 106 Cal. App.
2d at 224, 234 P.2d at 689.
168 Id. at 226, 234 P.2d at 690.
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tures.' 69 Section 9-313 of the UCC makes no attempt to determine
what constitutes a fixture. The UCC allows each state to use its own
definition of a fixture and authorizes the use of legal principles other-
wise applicable to real estate. 170 It is clear that extra precautions are
needed to protect a security interest in a mobile home. Unless there is
certainty in the jurisdiction as to when a mobile home becomes a fix-
ture, full protection can be attained only by filing both as a fixture
7'
and as a chattel.72 A mortgage upon the real estate involved may also
be desirable in some situations.
73
Apart from protecting a security interest in a mobile home, a
creditor may be more concerned with obtaining priority over a com-
peting security interest in the same mobile home. If the mobile home
will not become a fixture under law, UCC § 9-312(4) provides that
the seller, in order to protect himself, must file a financing statement'74
169 UCC § 9-313, notes 170, 175 and 193, infra.
7oUCC § 9-313(1):
The rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated into a
structure in the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal
work and the like and no security interest in them exists under this
Article unless the structure remains personal property under ap-
plicable law. The law of this state other than this Act determines
whether and when other goods become fixtures. This Act does not
prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures or real estate
pursuant to the law applicable to real estate.
'7' See text accompanying note 182.
172UCC § 9-401(1)(a).
'7 See text following note 177.
174 It will be helpful at this point to review the terminology used by the
UCC in article 9. A security agreement is entered into between the secured
party (creditor) and the debtor. The security agreement may take many forms,
including a conditional sale contract or chattel mortgage, but whatever form
it takes, the UCC provisions relating to a security agreement apply. The
security agreement creates a security interest in the collateral, which, for our
purposes, will be a mobile home.
This security interest is said to attach to the collateral when three things
have occurred: (1) There is an agreement that it attach (security agreement);
(2) the secured party has given value; and (3) the debtor has rights in the
collateral. UCC § 9-204(1). The time of attachment becomes important in
determining whether subsection 2 or 3 of § 9-313 applies. See note 175 infra.
Usually the security interest must be perfected to make it enforceable
against third parties. This is done in one of three ways: (1) By taking pos-
session of the collateral; (2) by filing a notice in the public office(s) as re-
quired by the UCC; or (3) by doing nothing if the security agreement arises
from the sale of the mobile home. This third means of perfection is valid
against everyone but a secondhand purchaser who buys the mobile home
without knowledge of the security interest, for value and for his own personal,
family or household purposes. UCC § 9-307(2). The secured party must file
a financing statement to protect his security interest from such a person.
A financing statement is the notice that is filed to inform the public that
a lien might exist. It must be signed by both the debtor and the secured party,
it must give their addresses, and it must contain a description of the collateral.
UCC § 9-402(1). Usually the security agreement itself can be adapted to this
use.
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within ten days after the debtor takes possession. However, if the
mobile home does become a fixture, UCC § 9-313 is important in de-
termining the priorities of competing security interests.' 5 Subsection 2
applies to a security interest that attaches to goods before they become
fixtures. For example, in the usual situation the sale of a mobile home
is made pursuant to a conditional sale contract. The house trailer is
then set up on the land where it is to be used. If it becomes a fixture,
subsection 2 gives the seller priority over the claims of all persons who
have an existing interest in the real estate. Suppose a bank has a re-
corded mortgage on both the land and any existing or after-acquired
personalty located thereon. If the mobile home was brought onto the
land as a fixture, the seller's security interest would automatically have
priority over the bank's then-existing mortgage under subsection 2.
Subsection 3 applies to a security interest that attaches to goods
after they become fixtures. This situation can arise if a mobile home
already affixed to the land is used as collateral for a loan. To have a
valid security interest against any person with an interest in the real
estate, the creditor must obtain from such person written consent 76 to
the security interest or a disclaimer' 71 of an interest in the mobile home
as a fixture. However, these precautions may not protect a secured
party if there is a prior unrecorded mortgage on the land. If the se-
1
7 5 The pertinent text of UCC § 9-313 is as follows:
(2) A security interest which attaches to goods before they
become fixtures takes priority as to the goods over the claims of all
persons who have an interest in the real estate except as stated in
subsection (4).
(3) A security interest which attaches to goods after they be-
come fixtures is valid against all persons subsequently acquiring in-
terests in the real estate except as stated in subsection (4) but is
invalid against any person with an interest in the real estate at the
time the security interest attaches to the goods who has not in writing
consented to the security interest or disclaimed an interest in the
goods as fixtures.
(4) The security interests described in subsections (2) and (3)
do not take priority over
(a) a subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the real
estate; or
(b) a creditor with a lien on the real estate subsequently ob-
tained by judicial proceedings; or
(c) a creditor with a prior encumbrance of record on the real
estate to the extent that he makes subsequent advances
if the subsequent purchase is made, the lien by judicial proceedings
is obtained, or the subsequent advance under the prior encumbrance
is made or contracted for without knowledge of the security interest
and before it is perfected. A purchaser of the real estate at a fore-
closure sale other than an encumbrancer purchasing at his own fore-
closure sale is a subsequent purchaser within this section.
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cured party is unaware of this mortgage, he obviously will not seek to
secure a disclaimer. Subsection 3 says that the security interest in a
fixture is invalid as to any person who had an interest in the real estate
when it attached. There is no requirement that the prior interest in the
land be recorded.' A better means of protection is provided by a
second mortgage on the whole of the real estate.'79 Such a mortgage,
once recorded, prevails over prior unrecorded mortgages. It also pro-
vides a wider base of collateral for the secured party.
In applying subsections 2 and 3, the key distinction is the time
when the security interest attaches.'8 0 If there is any doubt whether the
security interest will attach before or after the mobile home is affixed
to the real estate, subsection 3 precautions (consent or disclaimer)
should be taken to insure maximum protection.
The secured party must also protect himself from subsequent
claims against the mobile home.8 ' Subsection 4 requires him to per-
fect "'82 his security interest in order to take priority over (1) a sub-
sequent purchaser for value; (2) a lien subsequently obtained by
judicial proceedings; or (3) subsequent advances made or contracted
for by a prior encumbrancer of record. The secured party will prevail,
however, if any of these three parties have actual knowledge of the
security interest in the mobile home.
To perfect his fixture security interest, the secured party must
comply with the filing provisions of the UCC; Section 9-401(1) pro-
vides:
The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest
is as follows: ... (b) when the collateral is goods which at
the time the security interest attaches are or are to become
fixtures, then in the office where a mortgage on the real
estate concerned would be filed or recorded.
Section 9-402(1) adds: "When the financing statement covers ...
goods which are or are to become fixtures, the statement must also
178 Id.
'79UCC § 9-313(1) allows fixture-secured parties to be governed by real
estate principles.
'
80 See note 174, supra.
181 There has been some disagreement among the authorities as to what
the term "subsequent" means in subsection 4. Does it mean subsequent only
to attachment, or subsequent to attachment and affixation? For a discussion
of differing views see 2 P. COOGAN, SEcuRm TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UCC
1791 n.18 (1963); G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
827 (1965).
'
8 2 See note 174, supra.
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contain a description of the real estate concerned. .. ." In a typical
situation, the mobile home dealer moves a house trailer, which has
been sold under a conditional sales contract, to its permanent location
where it becomes a fixture. In order to perfect his interest and protect
himself from a subsequent purchaser, the dealer must file a financing
statement 8' describing the real estate to which the trailer is affixed. It
must be filed in the county where the trailer is located.
It should be noted at this point that the filing provisions of article
9 do not apply when the mobile home is required to be titled under a
motor vehicle statute.84 Such a requirement would be created if the
mobile home was to be moved by its owner on the public highways. 85
In such a situation perfection is obtained by a notation of the security
interest on the face of the certificate of title
8 6
In many instances the purchaser sets up his mobile home on a
rented lot. Since he does not intend to make it a part of the realty, the
trailer keeps its status as personalty and cannot be perfected as a
fixture. 87 When the trailer is moved to the lot by the dealer, no certifi-
cate of title is required to be issued. 88 In this situation, the dealer's
interest is automatically perfected when it attaches,'89 giving him pri-
ority over everyone except a subsequent purchaser who buys the
mobile home for use as his residence.' 0 This lone exception can be
guarded against by filing a financing statement in the county where the
debtor resides.'' As mentioned at the outset of this discussion, the
safest way to obtain full protection is to file both as a fixture and as a
chattel.'92
183 Id.
184 UCC § 9-302(3)(b) and (4). West Virginia's motor vehicle statute
is found in W. VA. CODE ch. 17A (Michie 1966).
'85 See W. VA. CoDE ch. 17A, art. 1, § 1(j) in conjunction with ch. 17A,
art. 3, § 2 (Michie 1966).
1
86 W. VA. CODE ch. 17A, art. 4A, § 1 (Michie 1966).
187Se text following note 153.
18 W, VA. CoDE ch. 17A, art. 6, § 1 (Michie 1966).
189 UCC § 9-302(1) (d).
190UCC § 9-307(2).
'9' UCC § 9-401(1) provides:
The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as
follows: (a) When the collateral is ... consumer goods, then in the
office of the county clerk in the county of the debtor's residence or
if the debtor is not a resident of this State then in the office of the
county clerk in the county where the goods are kept ....
92See text following note 170. In West Virginia, the relatively few
financing statements involving fixtures are filed together with the vast number
of financing statements involving personalty. They are indexed together In
the same set of books. An undue burden is thus placed on the attorney making
a land title search. Most attorneys in Kanawha County take the risk of not
examining this set of books when searching titles. Address by John T. Copen-
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If the debtor defaults, a secured party who has priority over all
other claims may remove the mobile home from the real estate,' 93 an
action usually known as repossession. However, the secured party
must reimburse anyone with an interest in the real estate for any
physical injury done to the land when the fixture is removed.'-94 The
secured party may even be forced to give security for this obligation
before he is allowed to remove the mobile home.' 5 Usually this will be
of little concern to the dealer, since a mobile home can be removed
with little or no damage to the real estate.
When a mobile home resident defaults in the payment of his lot
rental, the park owner may assert a lien on the mobile home.'19 In such
a situation, the mobile home is usually burdened with a chattel mort-
gage to secure its purchase price. Who will prevail between these
conflicting interests? It must be noted that article 9 of the UCC does
not apply to a landlord's lien.'97 Statutes that create a lien for landlords
usually protect prior lien-holders. Some states have even passed spe-
cific legislation that gives liens on the property of tenants to mobile
home park operators.' 98 However, since priorities differ under these
statutes, each prospective lien-holder should look to the controlling
law in his state in determining the safest course of action.
In West Virginia, if the property is subject to a lien that was valid
against the tenant's creditors when brought onto the premises, only the
tenant's interest in the property is liable for distress. 199 Even if the lien
is not recorded, actual knowledge of such lien by the landlord before
haver, Referee in Bankruptcy for the Southern District of West Virginia,
Mercer County Bar Association, May 20, 1968. Mr. Copenhaver suggests that
the recording statute be amended to create a separate index and filing system
for fixtures. An alternative would be to include the fixture financing state-
ments with trust deeds.
193UCC § 9-313(5) provides:
When under subsections (2) or (3) and (4) a secured party has
priority over the claims of all persons who have interests in the real
estate, he may, on default, subject to the provisions of Part 5, re-
move his collateral from the real estate but he must reimburse any
encumbrancer or owner of the real estate who is not the debtor and
who has not otherwise agreed for the cost of repair of any physical
injury, but not for any diminution in value of the real estate caused
by the absence of the goods removed or by any necessity for replac-
ing them. A person entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission
to remove until the secured party gives adequate security for the
performance of this obligation.
1941d.
195 Id.




98 See B. HODS & G. ROBERSON, supra note 196, at 229 n.37.
199 W. VA. CODE ch. 37, art. 6, § 13 (Michie 1966).
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the property is moved on the premises would give the prior lien-holder
priority over the landlord's lien for rent. 00 Since the landlord's lien
attaches at the moment the property reaches the premises, 10' the West
Virginia landlord has priority over any creditor who subsequently per-
fects his lien on such property. 02 The only exception is a conditional
seller who records the conditional sale contract within ten days after
the sale is made.203 Thus, the mobile home dealer in West Virginia is
protected from the landlord's lien if he files his financing statement
within ten days of the purchase.
20
4
A person who is financing the purchase of a mobile home should
be aware of the problems created by homestead exemptions. Most states
have statutes that allow this exemption from creditors' claims. Their
purpose is to secure a place of residence for the family. The amounts
of these exemptions vary widely from state to state,23 but the concept
remains basically the same. Whether these exemptions apply to mobile
home residents is sometimes a difficult question. Although the stan-
dards of qualification for the homestead exemption vary, a mobile
home generally must be affixed to the realty and its owner must have a
sufficient interest in the realty.206 For example, when the mobile home
is used as the permanent residence of its owner and has become a
fixture on his land, there is no question that it should qualify as a
"homestead." At the other extreme, if the mobile home is being moved
on the highways it is no longer affixed to the land and would not
qualify for the exemption under most homestead statutes.
Problems arise when the mobile home is used as a residence upon
a leased lot. Does the resident have a sufficient interest in the land?
200 Brown v. Woody, 98 W. Va. 512, 127 S.E. 325 (1925).
201 W. VA. CODE ch. 37, art. 6, § 18 (Michie 1966).
202 Prior to State ex rel. Payne v. Walden, the West Virginia landlord
usually enforced his lien through distress for rent proceedings. W. VA. CoDn
ch. 37, art. 6, §§ 12, 13 (Michie 1966). The Payne decision struck down
these provisions as unconstitutional on the ground of lack of due process. See
74 W. VA. L. Ruv. 170 (1972).
203 Brown v. Woody, 98 W. Va. 512, 514, 127 S.E. 325, 326 (1925).
204 For a more complete discussion of secured transactions and the West
Virginia landlord's lien see 65 W. VA. L. REv. 40 (1962).
205 The western states usually allow a larger exemption than those in the
east. Compare West Virginia's $1,000 homestead exemption allowance, one of
the lowest in the nation, W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 9, §§ 1-5 (Michie 1966),
with the $5,000 exemption permitted by Texas, Tux. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
3833 (Vernon 1966).206 In West Virginia, the requirements of a homestead are obscure. In-
cluded in the homestead is the land "together with the premises and appur-
tenances thereunto belonging." W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 9, § 2 (Michie
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Cases in Texas °7 and Nebraska? 8 have held that a tenancy from month
to month in the real estate is a sufficient interest to support the home-
stead claim. A more difficult question for the courts has been the
degree of affixation necessary. Texas cases have considered this ques-
tion, but the answers have been inconsistent. In Clark v. Vitz, 20 9 a
mobile home was attached to the owner's house and used as an extra
room. The court held that it was not a legal fixture, but found that it
was sufficiently affixed to the land to qualify as part of the homestead.
This policy was seemingly reversed in Gann v. Montgomery.210 The
court held that the Texas homestead statute did not apply unless the
place of residence had "the characteristics of a permanent fixture
attached to the realty."'2"1 In the most recent Texas decision on this
issue, Capitol Aggregates, Inc. v. Walker,' 2 the court established a
fixture standard to determine whether the house trailer was "affixed"
to the land.213 Regarding the issue of intention, however, the court
seemed to adopt a different test than that used in the determination of
a fixture. The court was satisfied that the mobile home had been affixed
to the land "with the intention to enhance the usability of said lease-
hold estate in said land as the plaintiffs' home.
' '214
The case indicates an abandonment of the strict fixture test of
Gann and an attempt to give effect to the plain intent of the Home-
stead Act - to secure for the family a place of residence. This same
philosophy with respect to mobile homes has been adopted in at least
two other jurisdictions.
21 5
It is clear from the foregoing that a seller or other creditor with a
security interest in a mobile home should protect himself from the
homestead exemption. Real estate mortgages often contain a clause
that waives the right to a homestead exemption. A similar clause can
be inserted into the mobile home security agreement to provide the
desired protection. Such action by the seller would probably not be
207 Capitol Aggregates, Inc. v. Walker, 448 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969).
208 n re Foley, 97 F. Supp. 843 (D.C. Neb. 1951).
209 190 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
210 210 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
211 I d. at 260.
212448 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).213 The following tests were used: (1) Actual physical annexation to the
realty; (2) application or adaptation to the use or purpose to which the realty
is devoted; and (3) an intention on the part of the person making the annex-
ation to make a permanent accession to the freehold. Id. at 834. See text
following note 153.
214 448 S.W.2d at 832 (emphasis added).21SIn re Foley, 97 F. Supp. 843, 847 (D.C. Neb. 1951); In re Williams,
24 F. Supp. 440, 441 (D.C. Ore. 1938).
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necessary in West Virginia. The homestead statute in West Virginia 16
allows no exemption for debts incurred for the "purchase money" of
or the "erection of permanent improvements" on the real estate. A
debtor can hardly argue that his mobile home is part of his homestead
but is neither realty nor an improvement thereon.1 7 A subsequent lien
creditor need not obtain a waiver of an unrecorded homestead exemp-
tion in West Virginia, since the homestead is not exempted from debts
contracted before the declaration of the exemption is recorded.28
Thus, in practice, West Virginia's homestead exemption offers very
little protection for the debtor.
The status of a mobile home as personalty or fixture may be im-
portant in determining the liability of an insurer. When a fire loss has
occurred, "valued policy" statutes in many states make the measure
of damages the same as the amount of fire insurance written into the
policy.2 1 This rule usually applies only to realty and improvements on
realty.220 If personal property is lost in a fire, the measure of damages
is simply the value of that property.
In Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Denniston,2' the court had
to decide whether a house trailer had lost its identity as "personal
property" within the valued policy law. The fixture test was used, n2
and the trailer was found not to be a part of the realty.223 Although the
trailer was insured for $7,500, plaintiff Denniston recovered only
$3,550, the approximate value of the trailer. The fixture distinction
was thus worth approximately $4,000 to the litigants.
216W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 9, § 3 (Michie 1966).
217W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 9, § 2 (Michie 1966). The exemption
declaration must include a description of the land, together with the premises
and any appurtenances. Hence, a mobile home would have to be either realty
or an improvement thereon (appurtenance) to qualify under the homestead
exemption in the first place.
218 W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 9, § 3 (Michie 1966). See also Linsey v.
McGannon, 9 W. Va. 154 (1876).2 19 The "valued policy law" in West Virginia is in W. VA. CODE ch. 33,
art. 17, § 9 (Michie 1966). In case of a total loss, the insurer is liable for
the face amount of the policy. A total loss occurs when a prudent owner
who had no insurance would build a new building instead of trying to repair
the damaged one. Nicholas v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., 125 W. Va. 349,
24 S.E.2d 280 (1943).
220Annot., 109 A.L.R. 1485 (1937). In West Virginia the statute applies
to insurance "upon such real property." W. VA. CODE ch. 33, art. 17, § 9
(Michie 1966).
221 237 Ark. 768, 376 S.W.2d 252 (1964).
222 See note 203, supra.
223 The mobile home was located on land not belonging to its owner, the
wheels and tires remained attached, and the owner testified that he would
take it off the property unless he sold it. 237 Ark. at 776, 376 S.W.2d at 256.
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The same issue was decided in Meccage v. Spartan Insurance
Co.,224 the court holding that a mobile home was an "improvement on
real property 22 within the valued policy statute. No fixture standard
was used, although the trailer home would probably have qualified as
a fixture under the threefold test.226 The court stated that the trailer
was "clearly affixed to the land '227 since it was connected to a sewer
and rested upon a permanent foundation. The plaintiff recovered
$3,000, the amount of the policy, instead of the trailer's estimated
value of $1,500.
An insurer, therefore, should not allow its policy coverage to
exceed greatly the value of a mobile home that has become a fixture, at
least in those states that have a "valued policy" statute. Conversely, an
insured whose mobile home is not a fixture should realize that his re-
covery may be limited to the value of the home instead of the face





224 156 Mont. 135, 477 P.2d 115 (1970).
225 Id. at 139, 477 P.2d at 117.
226 The owner had removed the wheels and placed the mobile home on
a permanent foundation on his farm. Two additional rooms had been bolted
to the trailer, and various utilities were connected. Id. at 136, 477 P.2d at 116.
227Id. at 138, 477 P.2d at 117. The court used the definition of an "im-
provement on real property" found in the Montana property tax statute that
required affixation to the land.
* Mr. Summers prepared part I, Mr. Fahrenz prepared part II, and Mr.
Shepler prepared parts IT and IV of this article.
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APPENDIX I
SURVEY OF THE COUNTY ASSESSORS OF WEST VIRGINIA ON
PROCEDURES USED IN TAXING MOBILE HOMES
Class in which Mobile Time
Home is Placed Cty.
when situated on: Has
.Followed
Owned Leased Proce-
County Land Land Other dure Rationale
1. Barbour 11 II - - Application of Code
Definition
t - 2 yrs. Rec. of State Tax
Comm.
Not really responsive
rn-IV - 2 yrs.
m-1v - 20 yrs.



















1. Those marked with an asterisk(*) are the counties which reduce the
assessed valuation of mobile homes on leased land to equalize the taxes
between Class H and Classes III and IV.
2. Some of the assessors responding to the survey did not want to in-



















Rec. of State Tax
Comm.
2A in Class II*
% in Class I or IV
State Tax Commission
50% in Class 11*








Def. of Class I
Personal Prop. is
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37. Name Unknown I1
38. Name Unknown IT
39. Name Unknown H
40. Name Unknown 11
41. Name Unknown 11
42. Name Unknown H
43. Name Unknown 11
STUDENT NOTES
(Appendix I continued.)
Class in which Mobile Time
Home is Placed Cty.
when situated on: Has
oowed
Owned Leased Proce-
Land Land Other dure
II Il - -
11 Il-IV - Always
11 rn-IV - I yr.
















to II and IV
Class If-50%*
Class rn-IV- 25%
On leased land gets II
only by furnishing 1
yr. lease or contract
If in I or IV,*
Valued at of II.
ID yrs.
-- - Classes Mn and IV
are Pers. Prop.
5 yrs. On owned, Taxpayer
can choose whether he
wants Class H or IV
- 4 yrs. Rec. by State Tax
Commissioner
J.U - L yrs.
III-IV - 10 yrs. Taxed at 50% of
trailer value after
depreciation
rI-IV - 8 yrs. State Schedule
II-IV - 18 yrs. Class II is Real Estate,
n and IV are Pers.
Prop.










Must o*n land to
qualify for II
Reduce value on those*
on leased land so taxes
equal those i i Class II.
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APPENDIX H
SURVEY OF THE LAWS OF THE 50 STATES PERTAINING TO
TAXATION OF MOBILE HOMES
L States that tax Mobile Homes as Realty
1. ALAs. CODE § 29.53.040 (1972) (Realty if attached and not expressly
taxed as personalty by local ordinance),
2. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1930 (Supp. 1970).
3. KAN. STAT. Am. § 8-143 (Supp. 1972) (Realty if owner of mobile
home owns land and mobile home permanently attached, otherwise
registered under motor vehicle code).
4. Ky. REv. STAT. § 132.750 (1971) (Treated as realty if wheels removed
and rests on permanent foundation).
5. ID. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19 (1969) (Realty if used for residential
purpose and permanently attached).
6. ItcH. STAT. ANN. § 7.2(1) (1971) (When located on land assessable
as real property and used for habitation whether or not permanently
affixed).
7. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 10007-73 to 88 (Supp. 1971) (Personalty if not on
mobile home owner's land. If on mobile home Owner's land, taxpayer
has option of declaring whether real or personal property at the time of
registration.).
8. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-103 (1971) (Mobile home is real estate If "per-
manently attached").
9. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 72:7-a (Supp. 1972).
10. N.Y. CODE REAL PROP. TAX § 102(12)(g) (McKinney 1972) (Real
property if located in boundaries of assessing unit for 60 days; the value
of the trailer is included in the assessment value of the land).
11. ORE. REv. STAT. § 308.875 (1971) (If the land and the mobile home are
owned by the same person, the mobile home is real property. If the
land and mobile home are owned by different people, the mobile home
is personalty. The fact that a mobile home is real property doesn't exempt
it from licensing and registration as a motor vehicle.).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-201 (1968) (Mobile home is real property
if permanently attached).
13. 'IEx. CODE Cvim STATS. art. 7146 (Supp. 1972-73) (Real property if
within boundary of assessing unit for 60 days. Value of mobile homo is
included in the value of the land if owned by the same person. If not
owned by the same person, assessed in the name of the mobile home
owner. The land is only subject to execution for non-payment of taxes
if the land and mobile home are owned by the same person.),
14. WASH, REv. CODE ANN. § 84.04.090 (Supp. 1972) (Real estate whether
on owned or leased land if it substantially loses its identity as a mobile
unit by being placed on permanent foundation and attached to utilities).
Ir. States that Treat Mobile Homes as Personalty
1. Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-642 (Supp. 1971-72).
2. MINN. STAT. § 168.012(9) (1960).
3. MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 84-6601 (Supp. 1971).
4. NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 361-561 to 563 (1971).
5. S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 10-9-2 & 10-9-9 (1969).
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-829.3 (Supp. 1972).
M. States that Treat Mobile Homes as Motor Vehicles
1. Ar A. CODE tit. 51, § 704(1) & (2) (Supp. 1971) (Exempt if taxed as
part of realty).
2. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3-4(e) (1963).
3. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-11-1.2 (1972).
4. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4503.06 (Supp. 1972).
5. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 22.5m (Supp. 1972-73) (Taxed as motor
vehicle except when wheels have been removed and it becomes a per-
manent improvement on land).
6. IowA CODE ANN. § 135d.22 (1972).
[Vol. 75
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7. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-105(d) (Supp. 1972) (Taxable as motor vehicle
whether or not attached to the land).
8. Wyo. STATS. § 31-16(h) (Supp. 1971) (Requires registration under the
motor vehicle code but does not specifically exempt from taxation as
real or personal property).
IV. States that Tax Mobile Homes by a License Fee System
1. CAL. HEALTn & SAFETY CODE §§ 18200-18203 (Supp. 1972).
2. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 12-63a (1958) (Municipalities can provide
for monthly license fee in lieu of property tax).
3. FL.A. CONST. art. VII, § l(b). (Mobile homes are subject to a license
fee and exempt from ad valorem taxation).
4, ILL. REv. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 169 (Supp. 1972).
5. IND. STAT. NN, § 35-2870 (1969).
6. IowA CODE ANN. § 135d.22,1972).
7. MAss, GEN. LAws ANN. ch, 140, § 32G (1972) (Mobile home park
operator collects monthly fees from occupants which he pays to the
municipality).
8. Mo. STAT, ANN. § 144,560 (Supp. 1973).
9. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:52-1 (Supp. 1972-73).
10. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-55-05 (1972) (Tax decal obtained from county
auditor in lieu of property tax).
11, VT. STAT, ANN. tit. 24, § 2232 (1967).
12. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.058 (Supp. 1973) & § 70.112(7) (1969). (Mobile
homes are exempted from general property tax and municipal units are
empowered to enact "trailer park ordinances").
V. States that Have No Specific Statutes on Taxation (This does not, how-
ever, mean that mobile homes are not taxed in these states.)
1. Arkansas
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